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ABSTRACT
This article considers attempts to incorporate lessons and transfer
policies from Britain in the reconstruction of Higher Education in
Kosovo after 1999. In doing so, it employs aspects of the lesson-drawing
framework developed by Rose (1991 and 2001) and the related
concepts of policy transfer and policy diffusion. Drawing on
contributions from anthropology and democratization studies, we
suggest development of the public policy frameworks for lesson drawing
and policy transfer in circumstances characterised by asymmetric
interdependence, in which the tactics and strategies of policy resistance
by ‘subordinate’ recipient actors can be crucial. This article details the
nature of policy resistance and sets out hypotheses for future research.
While concepts such as globalisation and interdependence are con-
tested within academe, there is consensus that national boundaries are
subject to increasing penetration both materially and ideologically and
ideas and practices are transferred from one place to another. This is
most notable in the public policy literature, with the conceptual devel-
opments of lesson-drawing, policy transfer and policy diffusion. These
concepts were developed and have been applied to cases where the
transmission process has been largely horizontal across independent
states. Lessons are also drawn and policies transferred and diffused
where there is ‘external’ pressure on state actors to adopt particular
policies. This may be evident where states have pooled sovereignty (e.g.,
the European Union) or are subject to pressure from international
agreements (e.g. World Trade Organisation, global environmental
protocols). It is certainly the case in post-conﬂict societies where inter-
national institutions and agencies are directing change and, in particu-
lar, where change is associated with external attempts to democratize
states. This process is increasingly common, as democratization has
become ‘a genuinely global aspiration’ (Grugel, 2002: 239). In this
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process, the power relationship between the ‘donor’ and the ‘recipient’
is characterized by asymmetric interdependence, with the former pos-
sessing more key power resources: political, legal, ﬁnancial, organis-
ational and informational.
We argue that in the context of asymmetric interdependence there
is a need for the public policy literature to hypothesize the dynamics of
relationships between the ‘dominant donors’ of ideas and practices and
the ‘subordinate recipients’. In particular, there is a need to theorise
the nature and intensity of domestic resistance to external policy
inputs. In developing the idea of policy resistance we have drawn on relev-
ant literature from anthropology and democratization studies. The col-
lective insights gained are then applied to the case study of the role
played by British actors in the reconstruction of higher education (HE)
in Kosovo following the end of the war there in 1999. We conclude by
developing hypotheses for the future study of policy resistance.
I Theoretical Development
In broad terms it is useful to distinguish between voluntaristic and
coercive lesson-drawing/policy transfer. In the former, supply is a func-
tion of demand: if a country wants to do so, it will take a lesson. In
the latter, demand is a function of supply: if a powerful international
organisation makes a condition, then the country is obliged to take it.
Lesson Drawing
Lesson-drawing refers to the process by which actors in one time or
place draw lessons from another time or place that are then incorpor-
ated into their own policies and practices. The lessons drawn may be
either positive or negative and, as such, may or may not lead to the
transfer of policies or practices. For Rose (1991:7), a lesson is an
‘action-oriented conclusion about a programme or programmes in
operation elsewhere’. Rose (1991: 21f) examines certain key features
that encourage and inhibit the process of lesson-drawing as well as
discussing some of the practical steps required for successful lesson-
drawing and identiﬁes ﬁve alternative methods of lesson drawing: copy-
ing, emulation, hybridization, synthesis, and inspiration.
For the most part, Rose argues, policymakers prefer to allow pro-
grammes to operate routinely without disruption. Given pressures on
time and resources, policymakers do not spend their time seeking to
create the ‘ideal’ policy in any given area but act as ‘satisﬁcers’. Sat-
isﬁcing behaviour seeks to maintain satisfaction with the status quo
with minimum disruption. As long as there is satisfaction with the
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status quo then current programmes can be allowed to run as routine.
The fact that another programme may be superior is not enough to
encourage satisﬁcers to promote a change of programmes that would
disrupt the current routine. Those who wish to see a change of pro-
gramme must promote a disjuncture between popular aspirations and
the achievements of the current programme, thus creating dissatisfac-
tion with the status quo. This is not always easy.
Sensitivity to context is crucial to understanding the potential for
lesson drawing. The nature of institutions, political values and ﬁnancial
resources vary enormously across, and indeed within, different states.
As such, ‘the greater emphasis given to inﬂuences from the past as the
dominant force affecting future national developments, the greater the
barrier raised to applying lessons from abroad’ (Rose, 2001: 4). In
short, to attempt a great leap forward without regard for context is a
policy of impossiblism (Rose, 2003: 7). Generally, policies from abroad
will be adapted to ﬁt the local context.
Policy Transfer
Policy transfer focuses on policy content and on the role of agency in
transferring ideas and practices from one time or space to another.
Dolowitz and Marsh (1996: 349–350) identify seven elements of policy
transfer: goals, structure and content; policy instruments or adminis-
trative techniques; institutions; ideology; ideas, attitudes and concepts;
and negative lessons. In seeking to explain why policy transfer occurs,
they distinguish between two types of transfer, voluntary and coercive. A
further distinction is made between direct and indirect coercive policy
transfer. Voluntary transfer refers to the process by which policy-makers
freely choose to adopt policies or practices from another place or time.
This process is usually the result of perceived dissatisfaction with
existing arrangements. Direct coercive transfer in its most obvious form
exists when one organization forces another to adopt a particular policy
or practice. This category could relate equally to the imposition of pol-
icies by one state on to another or by a supranational institution onto
a state. Indirect coercive transfer can arise from a range of factors: extern-
alities, technological change, global economic pressures and interna-
tional consensus. Each of these ‘push’ factors may lead to similar policy
responses from different states, often through cooperative working
(Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996: 348–9).
A number of factors may constrain the potential for policy transfer.
Generally, complex policies or practices will be more difﬁcult to trans-
fer than simple ones. This is related to the fact that each policy environ-
ment is different and anything transferred is necessarily planted into
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a different plot. Thus, even where shared ideological goals across
nations raise the prospects for successful policy transfer, existing pol-
icies and practices still place constraints. Other factors constraining
the potential for transfer include the stock of political, bureaucratic and
ﬁnancial resources available to the recipient organization or country.
Policy Diffusion
Policy diffusion focuses on the timing and sequence of the spread of
ideas and practices, rather than the content. Diffusion studies focus on
explaining why some states either adopt or adapt policies and practices
more readily than others. The policy diffusion literature places the con-
cepts of immunity and isomorphy at opposite ends of a spectrum.
Immunity is an extreme situation, which means that no diffusion of
policy is possible because the organisational or state unit is not recept-
ive to new external ideas (Bache and Olsson 2001: 218). The opposite
hypothesis of isomorphy says that diffusion of ideas and concepts occurs
quite easily, resulting in an efﬁcient homogenisation process across
states as states and organisations become increasingly similar (Meyer &
Rowan 1977; DiMaggio & Powell 1983).
Resistance is a strategy of reacting to pressures from outside a social
group. This may be an expression of strong organisational or national
identity, which can develop into a defence of established values that are
seen as threatened by external ideas. Strong and efﬁcient resistance,
including relying on inertia to block action, can make the individual
organisation or nation immune to new ideas and concepts. Imitation is
another way of reacting. This strategy is in line with the hypothesis of
isomorphy. Here, new ideas and concepts in the surrounding world are
adopted fast and uncritically. Every modern organisation is, in this per-
spective, open for new fashions of organisational design and practice.
The concept of adaptation indicates that diffusion is much more com-
plicated than is assumed by the imitation hypothesis (see Bache and
Olsson 2001: 218). Adaptation may occur on either the conceptual
level or in practice, or possibly both, but a separation may develop
between conceptual adaptation and practice. An organisation may
simply accept adaptation conceptually in order to register agreement
with dominating ideas or concepts in the surrounding world. Yet
changes on the conceptual level may eventually affect practice. This
process is described as the ‘virus effect’; new ways of acting will emerge
slowly and imperceptibly in relation to the level of discourse. In this
view, discourse works as a virus that spreads and ‘infects’ the behaviour
of the organisational or state unit.
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Policy Resistance
The dynamics and process of policy resistance is relatively under-
theorised. We take as a starting point the observation that ‘States are
notoriously resistant to change. Reform of state cultures and practices
and of the patterns of access to the state generally change incre-
mentally’ (Grugel, 2002: 244). Moreover, in the context of transferring
ideas and practices in an attempt to democratize states, the nature of
resistance to policy transfer will be shaped by past practices and embed-
ded interests. In the process of transition, behaviour ‘is dependent at
least as much on the weight of the past as it is on the imperative for
change’ (Grugel, 2002: 85). Finally, we argue that in all states there
will be some groups supportive of external inputs and some opposed;
the interplay between these domestic actors is important for under-
standing the prospects for lesson drawing, policy transfer or diffusion.
While the notions of voluntary and coercive policy transfer highlight
extremes, the process of policy transfer is unlikely to be exclusively
one or the other. Policy transfer may have both voluntary and coercive
elements, but is in reality a bargaining process between interdependent
actors. This bargaining should not be seen as a straightforward
external-internal process, but is more complex, with different domestic
actors taking different positions in relation to change. Some domestic
resistance is likely to feature in all cases. Even with the most coercive
incidence of policy transfer, those coercing are dependent on the
domestic policy implementers for effective transfer. As such, there is
always a degree of interdependence in the process, however asymmetric
that interdependence might be. Even the most subordinate of actors
have tactics and resources that can be deployed as part of a strategy of
resistance. Moreover, there is the possibility of a two-stage game. In
stage one, the process of policy transfer is largely coercive or hegemonic
as recipients accept donor conditions in order to receive beneﬁts. In
stage two, the process is more voluntaristic, as recipient implementers
can decide whether to resist or subvert the conditions agreed.
This point is well illustrated by James C. Scott’s study of class rela-
tions in a Malay village, where groups gave different accounts of the
same events to different audiences. These contradictory behaviours
were the product of their dependence on other groups and had, what
Scott (1990: ix) referred to as a ‘situational logic’: ‘The poor sang one
tune when they were in the preserve of the rich and another among
themselves. The rich spoke one way to the poor and another among
themselves’.
Scott illustrates how these contradictory behaviours formed part of
a resistance strategy for social groups in ‘the most severe conditions of
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powerlessness and dependency’, such as slavery and serfdom, noting
that ‘subordinates in such large-scale structures of domination never-
theless have a fairly extensive social existence outside the immediate
control of the dominant’ (1990: x–xi).
Even in a situation of domination, there are spaces open to exploita-
tion by both the dominator and the dominated. Both, but especially the
dominated, can develop a ‘hidden transcript’ that may play an import-
ant role in a context of apparent subordination. Central to this notion
of the hidden transcript is the contrast between a ‘hegemonic public
discourse’ and a ‘backstage discourse of what cannot be spoken in the
face of power’; the argument that there are ‘multiple audiences’ for
the ‘displays of domination’; and that powerless groups have an interest
in ‘conspiring to reinforce hegemonic appearances’ (Scott, 1990: xiii).
A characteristic feature of the dominated group’s behaviour is to avoid
irrevocable acts of public deﬁance, preferring instead to use ‘disguise,
deception and indirection, as tactics, while maintaining an outward
impression, in power situations of willing, even enthusiastic consent’
(Scott, 19970: 17).
More broadly, Scott (1990: 19) talks about the ‘infrapolitics of subor-
dinate classes’, meaning a ‘wide variety of low-proﬁle forms of resist-
ance’. Here, ‘most of the political life of the subordinate groups is to
be found neither in overt collective deﬁance of powerholders, nor in
complete compliance, but in the vast territory between these two polar
opposites’ (Scott, 1990: 136). This ﬁnal point chimes with our view
that in the context of asymmetric interdependence the process of policy
transfer is likely to be neither truly coercive, nor truly voluntary. Our
purpose here is to highlight the sophistication of resistance strategies
of apparently weak groups in the context of asymmetric inter-
dependence.
The University of Prishtina as an Ethnic Institution
To assist the reconstruction of higher education (HE) in Kosovo, the
British Department for Education and Employment (DfEE) funded
assistance from British universities to the University of Prishtina, the
most important HE institution in Kosovo. As part of this project, aca-
demics from Prishtina visited a number of UK university departments,
including the Department of Politics at the University of Shefﬁeld. The
authors of this article subsequently visited Kosovo on two occasions to
advise the University of Prishtina on establishing a new Department of
Political Science and Public Administration. Before and after visits the
exchanges between the researchers and the practitioners continued via
e-mail and telephone.
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The methodology for this study was a form of action research, in
which the researchers were involved in promoting change rather than
the ‘objective’ research process of description, understanding and
explanation (Lewin 1946). The action research approach involves
researchers reconciling understanding of the research situation with
promoting change in that context (see Robson 1992). In Kosovo, it
became clear that to give effective advice depended on interviewing
potential recipients in order to understand the local policy context.
Local policy-makers were keen to avoid what they called the ‘Frank-
enstein Syndrome’ occurring in Kosovo, which they believed had
developed in other post-Communist states. This was the inappropriate
adoption of practices from elsewhere producing a dysfunctional whole
considerably less than the sum of its component parts. Beyond this
concern, local actors had a range of interests to protect that were chal-
lenged by external pressures for change. Changes to the University of
Prishtina were of political, cultural and material importance to key
domestic actors both within and without the institution itself.
Background
The education system of Kosovo ‘has had a long history of inseparability
with the politics of the region’ (British Council 2000: Appendix 20,
para. 2). Between the ﬁrst and second world wars, all education in
Kosovo was conducted in Serbian. A 1948 survey found that 74 per
cent of Albanians aged 10+ were functionally illiterate and there was
a massive shortage of Albanian-speaking teachers. From 1945, the Tito
regime began to reverse this policy through a process that became
known as the ‘Albanianisation’ of the Kosovo educational system. Other
minorities within the Yugoslav Federal Republic were also taught in
their own language. However, Islam was suppressed and, from 1952,
teaching in mosques became a criminal offence. The Tito regime hoped
that this ‘stick and carrot’ approach to policy would inhibit the growth
of Kosovar Albanian identity and identiﬁcation with Enver Hoxha’s
Albania, but this hope was not realised. The education system became
the major transmission belt for a Kosovo Albanian identity (Malcolm
1998: 318). An important ethnic Albanian demand throughout this
period was that Kosovo be given its own university.
In 1968 demonstrations took place in Prishtina demanding a local
university, a demand clearly linked to separatist politics. While the
demonstrations were suppressed, Tito made further concessions inten-
ded to placate moderate Albanian opinion. In late 1969, it was agreed
that the subsidiary institutions of the University of Belgrade be trans-
formed and expanded into the University of Prishtina, a multi-ethnic
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institution teaching in Serbo-Croat and Albanian. In the next decade,
the proportion of students from an ethnic Albanian background grew
from 38 percent to 78 percent. The University subsequently played a
prominent role in the Albanianisation of Kosovo’s political, adminis-
trative and security apparatuses under the 1974 Constitution that
granted Kosovo substantial autonomy within the Yugoslav Federation
(Malcolm 1998: 326).
The subsequent expansion in student numbers at the University was
not matched by a comparable expansion in resources. On 11th March
1981, student demonstrations began over conditions at the University.
By April 1st, the demonstrations had expanded into political demands
from some protestors for full republic status, and calls from others for
a merger with Albania. These demonstrations involved both students
and workers. In response, the Yugoslav authorities condemned the Uni-
versity as a hotbed of Albanian nationalism, and the demonstrations as
separatist inspired counter-revolution. Textbooks, students and
teachers were purged, and cultural and personnel exchanges with
Albania were banned. Demonstrations were crushed using federal
police and military units as well as the newly created territorial militias
(Malcolm 1998: 335–36, Judah 2000: 39–41).
Belgrade blamed the University for fomenting discontent. However,
Kosovo’s low level of economic development, resulting in high graduate
unemployment, was a more important source of discontent. Serb
repression and high unemployment encouraged armed resistance and
led to an Albanian diaspora in Western Europe, especially Austria and
West Germany, and to a lesser extent in the United States. In the
1980s, many University of Prishtina graduates undertook postgraduate
education abroad and contrasted their experience in West European
universities with that in Kosovo. Many Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)
leaders in exile were former students of the University of Prishtina.
This reinforced the Serb view that the University was a nationalist
hotbed and that the Students’ Unions were increasingly pro-KLA. Not
surprisingly, the identiﬁcation of the University with the KLA was to
pose major problems after the Serb withdrawal from Kosovo in 1999:
competing factions of Kosovo society saw the University as a valuable
resource in post-conﬂict politics and as a means of leverage over the
development of the next generation of the Kosovo Albanian elite. More-
over, the return of the ‘lost generation’ of ethnic Albanian graduates
was to have important consequences for HE reform.
From the late 1980s onwards, the rise of Milosevic and Serbian
nationalism placed Kosovo’s autonomy under increasing threat. Up to
1990, educational policy in Kosovo was determined by the 1974 Consti-
tution, which gave Kosovo’s educational authorities considerable free-
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dom over both policy content and delivery. Milosevic made it clear he
regarded this aspect of autonomy as a threat to Serbia. This led to
further student-worker demonstrations in Prishtina in November 1988
in support of Titoism (strong Yugoslavia, weak Serbia). These demon-
strations were suppressed, but convinced Milosevic that the time was
right to act against Kosovo nationalism more directly (Malcolm 1998:
343).
In March 1989, the Milosovic regime forced the Kosovan Assembly
into conceding much of its autonomy. In July of the same year, the
Assembly was dissolved, in deﬁance of the 1974 Constitution. In 1990,
a range of powers, including those over education, was transferred to
Belgrade. Rilindja, an Albanian language publishing house and news-
paper in Kosovo was suppressed, the Kosovo Academy of Arts and
Sciences was closed, and thousands of Kosovo Albanians were dismissed
from the public services.
In May 1990, all remaining Albanians resigned from the public ser-
vices and in August-September new laws were passed imposing a new
curriculum at the University of Prishtina taught in Serbian. Between
September–December 1990, all Kosovo Albanian staff and students
were expelled from the University of Prishtina, and educational
segregation imposed (Malcolm 1998: 343–44). This policy of segrega-
tion was accompanied by efforts to degrade and impoverish Albanian
culture in Kosovo. In these efforts, an attack on the University of Prish-
tina was central. The result was that, by the beginning of the academic
year in 1991, the University had, ‘to all intents and purposes, became
a Serbian-only institution. Eight hundred and sixty three teachers and
staff were sacked’ (Judah 2000: 63). In response, the Kosovans began
to develop a parallel system, under the leadership of Ibraim Rugova
and the LDK (Democratic League of Kosovo). The Kosovo parliament
rejected Serbianisation, declared Kosovo’s independence and created a
shadow government, including an education ministry (Reitan 2000:
71–102).
The Parallel System, 1991–1999
Civil war in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in the early 1990s con-
vinced the Albanian political leadership that it could not provoke
Serbia. Instead, the policy was one of passive resistance to Serbia, which
led to the development of a ‘parallel’ HE system. Kosovan intellectuals,
many of them linked to the University of Prishtina, played a central
role in developing the philosophy of the parallel system, much of which
was ﬁnanced by the taxation of the Kosovan diaspora that eventually
numbered about 400,000. In October 1991, Ibraim Rugova and the
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LDK established in Bad Godesburg, Germany an embryonic state
apparatus for Kosovo, which levied taxes and made policy. Ninety per-
cent of revenues from this went towards education, which was at the
heart of the passive resistance programme. This gigantic system of self-
help undermined the attractiveness of Kosovo as part of a ‘Greater
Albania’ in favour of independence.
In the case of higher education, students were taught in private
homes by professors purged from the University of Prishtina. By 1995,
there were some 12,200 students organised in 20 faculties of the paral-
lel education system. The curriculum was concerned primarily with pro-
moting Albanian consciousness and identity, and drew on Albanian
resources. The process was heavily politicised and isolated from main-
stream education by both geography and police harassment. Moreover,
the system’s academic awards were recognised only by Albania.
In 1996, the LDK and the Ministry of Education in Belgrade reached
an agreement, brokered by an Italian catholic charity, which permitted
the return of Albanians to the mainstream higher education system
and the reactivation of the pre-1990 curriculum (British Council 2000:
182-I, para 33). However, this agreement was never implemented, due
to resistance from Serb students who saw this as a step towards separat-
ism. When Serb students refused ethnic Albanian’s access to University
facilities, the resulting demonstrations, this time led by KLA sympathi-
sers (Judah 2000: 135–36), were again suppressed. This incident rein-
forced the political nature of the parallel university, which was increas-
ingly run by political cadres under a Rector with enormous powers.
In the long run, the parallel system was not sustainable, given its
lack of technical infrastructure and the difﬁculties of delivery under
Serb harassment. Between 1989 and 1996, student numbers halved.
Despite this, the parallel university assumed enormous political signi-
ﬁcance as a symbol of Kosovan identity and determination. Those who
operated the parallel system saw themselves as front-line freedom
ﬁghters and the continued existence of the parallel university sym-
bolised for many the viability of an independent Kosovan state. The
parallel system ended with the conclusion of the war in 1999 when the
international agencies reincorporated the excluded Albanians into the
University of Prishtina.
The University of Prishtina’s importance within Kosovo can be seen
in four main areas. First, it provided physical evidence of an autonom-
ous intellectual Kosovan life. Second, it provided a training ground for
the ethnic Albanian elite. Third, it was a major developer of Kosovar
Albanian identity and consciousness. Fourth, the University and its stu-
dents were a focal point of resistance to Serbianisation. In short, the
University of Prishtina was an extraordinary educational institution
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because of its centrality in the intellectual and cultural life of ethnic
Albanian Kosovars (Judah 2000: 37–8). Only in this context, can the
importance of the University be understood to the reconstruction of
Kosovo after 1999; and, only when the importance of the University in
Kosovan life is recognised, can the nature and intensity of policy resist-
ance in response to external pressures for change be fully understood.
Reconstructing Higher Education in Kosovo: post-1999
Following the war in Kosovo education reform was placed under the
control of Professor Michael Daxner, the Principal International Ofﬁcer
of the United Nation’s Mission in Kosovo’s (UNMIK’s) Transitional
Administrative Department of Education, Science and Technology.
Daxner drew his authority from UN Security Council Resolution 1244,
which set out UNMIK’s reconstruction mandate. Daxner emphasised:
We are not here for the school directors, the ministers or the bureaucrats.
We are here for the teachers and the students. We have to de-politicize and
democratize the system. Because in the end, it is education which will play
the key role in peace-building (UNMIK 2000).
UNMIK’s statement of intent was knowingly ambitious, given resource
constraints and the realities of Kosovo Albanian politics. However,
UNMIK thought it necessary to articulate this vision publicly as a
means of bringing external pressure on those running the HE system.
During 2000–2001 UNMIK, aided by the Council of Europe and
Kosovo’s education community, drafted legislation that would underpin
the reformed education system. The laws sought to bring Kosovo’s edu-
cation system in line with those elsewhere in Europe.
In line with stated UN objectives, the British Council-funded project
aimed to assist the development of new departments at the University
of Prishtina, particularly within the social sciences. This was identiﬁed
as ‘a gap in the disciplinary provision of the University’ which ‘directly
related to the University’s stated role in the building of democratic
citizenship’ (Davies, 2001: 3). The University departments covered
were Political Science/Public Administration, Sociology, Journalism/
Media, Architecture, and Film Directing. These departments were
either undergoing fundamental reform after ten years of isolation from
wider academic networks, or were being developed for the ﬁrst time.
In relation to the University of Prishtina, it said:
The culture of learning at the University is seen to require an overhaul. In
the parallel system, there were huge problems of attendance, with almost a
part-time system in operation whereby students turned up only for the exam-
inations. There has been no staff development in terms of higher education
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pedagogy and both staff and students have been unused to using journals and
current information to inform their work (British Council, 2000: Appendix
20, para 8.3.1).
The British Council grant was spent on three types of activity: a study
tour to UK universities by University of Prishtina staff members in
Spring 2001 to discuss curriculum issues; visits to Kosovo between Feb-
ruary and October 2001 by UK academics and students to advise on
curriculum development, departmental reform and to engage in joint
seminars or projects; and provision of resources for departmental lib-
raries and ﬁlm equipment (Davies, 2001: 2).
In relation to the development of the Department of Politics and
Public Administration, the focus was on two issues: curriculum develop-
ment and staff recruitment. The ﬁrst of these issues was dealt with in
the initial study tour by Prishtina staff to the UK and in the ﬁrst visit
to Prishtina of staff from the Department of Politics at the University
of Shefﬁeld. The second issue was covered in a follow up visit to Prisht-
ina by Shefﬁeld staff. Advice on these two issues received very different
responses within Prishtina.
Curriculum Development
During the visit by Prishtina staff to Shefﬁeld, British academics soon
appreciated the need to understand both the practical consequences of
the post-war situation for HE in Kosovo and the pre-war political cul-
ture that had permeated the institutions and practices of education2.
Creating a University in Kosovo that would be capable of entering the
European HE mainstream would inevitably create conﬂict because ‘the
older generation will insist on a national curriculum including national
history and music. Current ministry ofﬁcials will be doubtful . . .
[others] will strive for an international balance looking outward to the
rest of Europe and the Western World’ (British Council, 2000:
Appendix 20, para. 8.22). There would also be problems integrating the
formal and informal parallel systems of education and then securing
implementation of UNMIK’s vision of a multi-ethnic, pluralist, liberal
university based on the Western model. Beyond this, resource con-
straints added to a complex context for reform attempts.
First, under the communist regime, there had been no Department
of Politics at Prishtina University. Prishtina staff stated that this had
not been permitted, although some staff claimed that the teaching of
politics had effectively taken place within other University depart-
ments, notably Law and Sociology. For Daxner and the UN, the devel-
opment of a Department of Politics was central to the University’s role
in the reconstruction of civil society and in educating future policy-
The Politics of Policy Resistance 291
makers along Western lines. As such, the visiting staff members were
seeking to develop the Politics curriculum in the context of UN support
for ‘successful’ British models.
Second, while the University of Prishtina was committed to introdu-
cing a Politics and Public Administration degree from October 2001,
the Department of Politics and Administration at the University
existed in name only. While a number of local academics, mainly from
other departments at the University of Prishtina, had been earmarked
to play a role in the new Politics Departments, none had actually been
appointed. Moreover, resource constraints meant the Prishtina staff all
had second jobs to supplement the meagre salaries paid by the
University.
Third, dependence on external funding from a range of international
donors for the reconstruction of HE (including UNMIK, individual gov-
ernments and a range of NGOs) meant that the Prishtina staff were
uncertain of the likely size of the new Department in terms of both
staff and students. This uncertainty over funding meant that it was not
clear whether appointees would be primarily local or international and,
related to this, what their subject specialisms would be. In one sense,
this uncertainty made the task easier. Not knowing the staff allowed
the curriculum to be developed on the basis of the perceived needs of
students and the wider social and administrative demands of Kosovo,
rather than being based around staff subject interests. Adjustments
would have to be made later if resources and/or recruitment problems
meant that the agreed curriculum could not be delivered.
Fourth, resource constraints meant that access to information would
be a major problem for both staff and students. The nearest library of
any size was a four-hour drive away from Prishtina and this contained
little relevant material on Politics and Public Administration. While
most new British university departments might overcome this problem
with extensive use of information technology (IT), this did not offer a
solution here. The Prishtina staff reported very limited access to com-
puter terminals within the University and the local telecommunications
network was in need of modernisation. Thus, while extending IT provi-
sion was a priority, the funding required for this provision was again
uncertain.
Curriculum Discussions
Despite conﬂicting interests and immense practical challenges, the
Prishtina staff visiting the UK expressed commitment to introducing a
Politics and Public Administration degree in October 2001: only eight
months forward of their visit to Britain. University of Prishtina staff
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and administrators were under great pressure from UNMIK to estab-
lish a politics department with the minimum delay.
Following initial exchanges at the University of Shefﬁeld, discussions
focused on the Department of Politics’ modular curriculum. The Uni-
versity of Shefﬁeld curriculum built from ﬁve core modules in year one:
Introduction to Political Analysis; An Introduction to Western Political
Thought; The Globalisation of World Politics; Comparing Modern Pol-
ities; and Modern British Politics. In years two and three, core modules
were increasingly replaced by option modules, allowing students
greater freedom of choice to specialise.
In adapting the modular structure for the University of Prishtina, a
number of factors had to be taken into account. First, Kosovo had an
urgent need to develop its civil service and this needed to be reﬂected
in the Politics curriculum. The teaching of Public Administration was
a priority and had to be incorporated into the model. Second, while
Prishtina University would be able to recruit the brightest students in
the country, the culture of education in Kosovo had traditionally not
emphasised the development of student skills needed for independent
learning. As such, there would be a need to expand the study skills
component of the curriculum. Finally, there was a need to incorporate
an English-language component into the structure to give students
access to a wide literature.
To reﬂect these points, the Year One core modules in the Prishtina
draft were revised to: Study Skills and Political Analysis; Political
Theory; International Politics; Public Administration; and English Lan-
guage. Again, it was re-stated that the curriculum might need revision
depending on staff. At this stage, however, it was deemed necessary to
‘get the balance right’ in relation to perceived needs and to attempt to
recruit accordingly.
In the discussions around core modules for the University of Prisht-
ina, differences in opinion began to emerge between the visitors. The
differences centred on the extent to which the curriculum should be
vocational or non-vocational in content. It is a debate that has been
much rehearsed in British higher education. On one side was an
emphasis on the University of Prishtina ‘training’ students for the civil
service; on the other side, the emphasis was on the development of
critical thinking among students. In this context, the modular structure
of the Shefﬁeld curriculum appealed to the visitors: beyond year one,
it provided greater ﬂexibility and students would be able to specialise
more in either vocational or non-vocational subjects. In addition, the
modular system made practical sense in terms of uncertainty over staff
appointees.
While there was a clear need for adjustment of the Shefﬁeld curric-
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ulum to meet the demands of the University of Prishtina, the modular
structure and key components of the curriculum content were accepted
enthusiastically by the visitors. Moreover, the eventual curriculum
structure and much of the content eventually adopted by the Senate of
the University of Prishtina largely reﬂected what had been agreed at
Shefﬁeld.
Staff Recruitment
The barriers to transferring Shefﬁeld practices in terms of staff recruit-
ment were demonstrably greater. The ﬁrst visit by Shefﬁeld staff to
Prishtina took place in July 2001. While ostensibly a visit to discuss
curriculum development, the curriculum structure had been agreed by
the Senate before the Shefﬁeld visitors arrived. As such, much of the
visit focused on other matters, notably: departmental structures and
staff administrative responsibilities; teaching and assessment methods;
module evaluation practices; student entrance requirements; and the
appointment of staff to the Department of Politics and Public Adminis-
tration. On most of these issues, the advice of Shefﬁeld staff was readily
accepted, with adjustments made according to local circumstances. On
the issue of staff recruitment however, the advice of Shefﬁeld staff met
with resistance.
During the July visit, Shefﬁeld staff provided personnel at the Uni-
versity of Prishtina with documents from the University of Shefﬁeld on
university procedures for recruitment. They also provided information
speciﬁcally on the requirements set out by the Department of Politics.
This included information on how posts are advertised, the professional
expertise required of successful applicants, and on the selection process
itself.
Despite the fact that by July no staff had been appointed to the new
Department of Politics and Public Administration, the University still
planned to launch the degree programme in October. The Shefﬁeld
staff expressed the need for immediate action to recruit international
staff, who would usually be required to give a signiﬁcant period of
notice to their existing institutions. This advice was accepted by the
international agencies funding and supporting the British Council pro-
gramme, and by the UN administrators working at the University.
However, resistance to the recruitment of international staff came from
local University staff and administrators. This resistance was aimed at
securing local control over appointments and therefore, in the longer
term, control over curriculum content and other aspects of University
policy.
Before the September visit, the Shefﬁeld staff were contacted by the
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UN administrators to comment on the advertisement for the posts pro-
posed by the University of Prishtina. The response from Shefﬁeld was
that the advertisements were so speciﬁc in relation to subject special-
isms they would limit the number of applicants. Moreover, some of
the module specialisms were quite unusual and prompted suspicion
in Shefﬁeld that the job descriptions had been designed with speciﬁc
individuals in mind. These views were shared with UN ofﬁcials working
at the University of Prishtina. They agreed with the concerns, but
proved unable to secure agreement with local University administrators
to change the advertisement.
The Shefﬁeld staff had also recommended that the advertisement be
circulated as widely as possible in the international academic commun-
ity to attract the best possible range of applicants. Shefﬁeld staff
offered to assist in this task, which would be cost-free via academic
e-mail networks. Again, the advice was not taken and the advertisement
for both international and local staff was only placed in the Kosovo
press, albeit in English. The closing date for applications in the advert
was shorter than was recommended by Shefﬁeld staff. Clearly, there
was little time to waste, but the consequence of this short deadline was
to limit the number of applications from overseas academics. The view
of UN administrators was that this was the outcome intended by local
administrators anxious to retain control of the University.
On arriving in Prishtina in September 2001 for a week-long visit,
the Shefﬁeld staff were informed that around 60 applications had been
submitted for the posts advertised, the majority came from Kosovo
nationals. The two Shefﬁeld staff visitors were also asked to participate
in a selection panel, along with two local professors and a UN adminis-
trator at the University. The arrangement was that the panel would
agree a shortlist and seek to contact as many shortlisted candidates for
interview or discussion by other means before the Shefﬁeld staff left at
the end of the week.
Due to series of delays caused by local panel members being unavail-
able, unsuitable or absent, planned meetings of the panel were can-
celled until UN administrators made it clear that the selection process
would continue in the absence of local staff if necessary. However, the
delay meant that it would not be possible for any candidates to be
interviewed before the Shefﬁeld academics left Kosovo. This was a par-
ticular problem because it emerged that many of the Kosovo applicants
shortlisted by the panel members from Prishtina did not appear suit-
ably qualiﬁed to teach politics: most were academic lawyers currently
employed at the University. Moreover, many of these candidates had
not submitted the information required in the job advertisement and
in some cases had not even formally applied. Finally, the panel agreed
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a shortlist, with recommendations for appointment. This shortlist and
accompanying statement was typed up in Albanian by one of the local
panel members. When it was translated back into English, at the insist-
ence of the Shefﬁeld staff, the paper contained no recommendations
for appointment. Instead, it merely identiﬁed suitable modules and
potentially suitable staff to teach them. The Shefﬁeld staff refused to
sign the document and instead drew up their own document containing
recommendations for appointments. The Shefﬁeld staff left with both
documents unsigned. The UN staff provided assurances that both docu-
ments would be presented to the University Senate.
However, control over stafﬁng, and thus the subsequent direction of
the University was not simply about politics. Corruption, while not a
feature of Kosovo society alone, was a particular problem facing inter-
national advisers. As Michael Daxner (2002: 12) put it ‘you can buy
examinations, grades, degrees, the right class for your children, the
right teacher. . .’. One illustration of this problem was local resistance
to the suggestion made by Shefﬁeld advisers that the University’s short
multiple choice entrance examination should be replaced with a written
examination. While corruption was not always an obvious issue, it was
nevertheless, what Daxner (2002: 12) described as the ‘unpleasant
reality’ of the situation.
The discussion above paints a bleak picture in relation to prospects
for reform at the University of Prishtina. However, there were also
positive signs. First, progress was made on issues such as curriculum
development, teaching and assessment methods and department struc-
tures. Second, while the Shefﬁeld staff faced resistance from some local
staff, they received considerable support from others: generally those
who had studied outside Kosovo and placed a high value on the Univer-
sity of Prishtina’s assimilation into the international academic com-
munity. There were clear and understandable tensions within the Uni-
versity about how it should move forward. Many of the Law and
Sociology professors who sought jobs in Politics had been the very
people who had maintained higher education for ethnic Albanians
through the parallel system. Quite understandably, they felt they did
not want to lose control over the University again. By contrast, support
for international initiatives came primarily from those academics, often
with KLA sympathies, who saw rejection of international advice as
insular and potentially damaging to Kosovo’s long-term development.
Some nine months after the ﬁnal visit of the Shefﬁeld staff, follow-up
research revealed a lack of progress in a number of areas. Department
members reported stafﬁng shortages in relation to the 200 plus stu-
dents recruited and poor library and internet facilities. In both cases,
part of the problem was with international donors failing to supply the
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necessary funding. More signiﬁcant for the long term, there were
reports of tensions between local and international staff within the Uni-
versity, with the latter claiming they were being undermined by the
former.
In summary, our ﬁndings echo those of a study on Power and
Property Relations Under the United Nations Mission in Kosovo:
‘It is relatively easy for an international mission to assert legal authority over
an area, but much more difﬁcult for it to build up the institutional resources
to fulﬁl a responsibility which exists on paper. There are clear dangers in
assuming powers without the capacity to exercise them. The social realm does
not remain idle, waiting for the international community to allocate attention
and resources. Any vacuum of authority is ﬁlled by domestic actors’ (UNMIK,
2002: 3).
Wider Implications
First, we emphasise the importance of local context – historical, polit-
ical and socio-cultural – to the success or otherwise of lesson drawing
and policy transfer. Rose’s (1993) argument that ‘the greater emphasis
given to inﬂuences from the past as the dominant force affecting future
national developments, the greater the barrier raised to applying les-
sons from abroad’ is particularly important in relation to democratising
states. As Grugel’s (2002: 85) study of democratization illustrated,
where ‘the past is non-democratic, democratising states are bound to
contain ambiguities, paradoxes and authoritarian enclaves’.
Control over the University of Prishtina was identiﬁed as an import-
ant political resource in a highly politicised society that featured ten
years of self-organisation in HE. In resisting changes that would under-
mine local control over education, local actors employed resistance
strategies honed by the experience of authoritarianism and subordina-
tion. These strategies were low-level, subtle and often disguised as
cooperation through the use of ‘hidden transcripts’. In the terms of the
policy diffusion literature, there was adaptation on a conceptual level
to demonstrate an attitude corresponding to dominant ideas, but no
indication that this adaptation would affect practice in the near future.
The nature and intensity of this resistance strategy can only be under-
stood in the context of Kosovo’s recent political history and the import-
ance of the University within that history.
That there was some policy emulation in this highly politicised context
(adoption, with adjustment for different circumstances), particularly in
relation to curriculum structure and content, is explained by two fac-
tors. First, was the absence of an existing policy, in this case a Politics
curriculum, which would have allowed the ‘satisﬁcers’ to defend the
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status quo. Second, while accepting the externally recommended curric-
ulum, the bigger issue for local administrators was that of appointing
staff. Those staff appointed would be responsible for revisions to the
curriculum and could amend according to locally determined priorities.
On staff recruitment, there was some rhetorical acceptance of advice
given but practical resistance leading to international advice being
ignored.
Tensions within the domestic polity were important in contributing
to the nature and intensity of policy resistance. Broadly, there was a
division between those who prioritised control over the University and
were resistant to international initiatives, and those who prioritised
international acceptance for the University and were thus supportive.
The former view had generally sustained the parallel system; the latter
view came from those who had studied abroad. This division largely
reﬂected the different domestic political afﬁliations of these actors,
with the latter group predominantly attached to or sympathetic to the
KLA, the former to the LDK.
The intensity of policy resistance to international initiatives for some
actors was reinforced by their desire to ensure that other domestic
actors were not empowered by changes. The nature of policy resistance
was partly a legacy of the political-administrative culture of the com-
munist era and also of the Kosovo Albanian need to survive and operate
under Serbian domination after 1989, a situation bearing resemblance
to Scott’s conditions of ‘powerlessness and dependency’. Many of the
tactics used to resist external initiatives after 1999 had been practised
under communism and further developed under Serb rule. The policy
resistors had, in Scott’s (1990: 138) terms, ‘a capacity to test and
exploit all the loopholes, ambiguities, silences and lapses available to
them’. At the root of this strategy was fear of retaliation to overt resist-
ance in the form of the denial of UNMIK resources or conﬂict with
other sections of Kosovo Albanian society, either of which could lead to
a loss of power. In such a complex and delicate situation, participants
cannot deﬁnitively know the balance of forces and the related distribu-
tion of resources, so the process is characterised by a continual testing
of boundaries. As Scott (1990: 199) notes, ‘Taking a long historical
view, one sees that the luxury of relatively safe, open political opposi-
tion is both rare and recent’.
These internal domestic tensions further highlight limitations to the
concepts of voluntary and coercive policy transfer. There were elements
of both voluntary and coercive transfer occurring simultaneously: some
domestic actors voluntarily embraced the advice coming from abroad,
while others were more resistant. The outcomes were determined
through a bargaining process that involved international actors and
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domestic actors with different views and different interests. Within this
process, different actors had varying levels of resources, political, legal,
ﬁnancial, organizational and informational, and employed various
tactics and strategies in deploying these resources in the transfer
process.
In a context of asymmetric interdependence, policy resistance
becomes more important. Even where there is a high degree of asym-
metric interdependence, subordinate actors can deploy sophisticated
resistance strategies that limit the processes of learning and transfer.
We offer the following hypotheses for investigating policy resistance:
1. States and other institutional actors are generally resistant to change. This
is particularly the case in the context of democratization, where
state institutions are undergoing (re) construction.
2. The domestic context is crucial to understanding the nature and intens-
ity of policy resistance and thus the prospects for successful lesson
drawing, policy transfer or diffusion. Within domestic politics,
there will be both advocates for change and resistors to change:
the balance between these actors must be understood to under-
stand the prospects for success. Moreover, the existence of multiple
international donors with competing objectives increases the scope
for domestic resistance.
3. Transmission of ideas and practices takes place through bargaining. In all
cases, there will be some domestic resistance to change. Since all
actors with a role in the policy process control some power
resources, political, legal, ﬁnancial, organisational and informa-
tional, the outcome of external inputs will reﬂect a bargaining pro-
cess in which external and internal actors employ different tactics
and strategies when mobilising differential resources in the con-
text of asymmetric interdependence. Where the power resources
of policy resistors are limited, the importance of resistance strat-
egies is heightened and they are more likely to be subtle and multi-
faceted and thus more difﬁcult to overcome.
4. Infrapolitics matter. Policy resistors may employ a range of strategies
to prevent change. In the context of asymmetric interdependence,
these are more likely to be characterised by low-level forms of res-
istance rather than overt opposition or deﬁance. In particular,
policy resistors may develop a hidden transcript, through which
there is outward agreement and cooperation that disguises strat-
egies of non-compliance and obstruction. In post-authoritarian
societies, domestic actors will be particularly skilled in activities
practised under the previous regime
For policy-makers, our main ﬁnding concurs with a parallel study on
power and property relations in Kosovo, which found that ‘no genuine
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social change can be brought about without identifying and working
with constituencies and local interests with a stake in such reforms’
(UNMIK, 2002: 4). For academics seeking to understand the signiﬁc-
ance of external inﬂuences on domestic change, we emphasize the
subtle power of resistance strategies that can be deployed to great
effect by the ‘powerless’.
NOTES
1. The authors would like to thank Richard Rose, Robert Castle and Enver Hasini for their
comments on earlier versions of this article. All the usual disclaimers apply.
2. The discussions took place in English. Older academics and administrators often did not
speak English and UN-funded translators were provided. These were young, western educated
graduates from Kosovo who were very cooperative with international actors. This was import-
ant because language differences offered a potential resistance opportunity, illustrated when
one of the documents relating to appointments was drawn up in Albanian. Its content differed
considerably from that drafted in English and the international actors could only verify this
with the help of the cooperative translators.
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